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THE NON-MANAGEMENT SIDE OF ACADEMIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
Michael A. Fitts∗ 
HOSE of us at the center of non-profit or for-profit organizations in the 
United States seldom expound on the challenges of our work.  Why?  
For one, many administrators view their responsibility as doing their job, not 
analyzing it.  From this perspective, the level of contemplation necessary for 
reflective insight is better achieved in the post administrative phase, better known 
as retirement.  There is an added benefit to such delay; in retirement, those who 
are the subject of any less-than-positive comments will not be able to respond.  
Indeed, posthumous publication adds to this strategic advantage, though it has an 
obvious downside if it comes too early. 
The University of Toledo Symposium is a welcome exception.  It affords 
acting deans—by which I mean deans who are now doing the job—the ability to 
step back and reflect on what it is they do, why they do it, and why it may or may 
not be successful.  Over the years, this symposium has published the work of a 
wide variety of administrators offering examples of the issues they have 
addressed, the knotty problems they have resolved, and the joys—and 
challenges—of their line of work.  There has been some theory implicit in this 
discussion, but for the most part, the articles have explored the trials and 
tribulations of running an institution from the vantage point of someone faced 
with balancing a myriad of constituencies pressing their particular vision—and 
advantage. 
In this piece, which will be far less useful and far more muddled than the 
others in this symposium, I wish to step back and muse about the role of being an 
academic administrator, including but not limited to a law school dean, and how 
it compares with running other types of institutions, especially for-profit 
organizations.  I will not draw from my own experience (I will thus eliminate the 
possibility of retaliation!).  Rather, I would like to take this opportunity to 
explore the nature of the jobs academic administrators face, and why and how 
they are often qualitatively different from the jobs other managers in society face.  
Along the way, I would like to explain a conundrum that many others have 
observed and commented on: why full time academics, as well as lawyers, keep 
being selected for these positions, even though they often lack any of the 
traditional managerial experience.  I will also comment on the difficulty non-
profit administrators face in performing their jobs well, but, at the same time, and 
not unrelatedly, the problem of establishing any clear standard of accountability 
and evaluating success or failure. 
                                                          
 ∗ Dean and Bernard G. Segal Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
T 
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First, let me begin with some background.  Outside the academy, the classic 
model of management is drawn from the for-profit private sector.  There are 
volumes of books written about the skills required for managing a team of 
people, how to focus the goals of the organization, how to execute, and, in the 
end, how to maximize the proverbial profit.  In this genre, I am not talking about 
the widely read books written by the larger than life business leaders, whether it 
be a Donald Trump or Jack Welch.  Rather, I am thinking of the standard 
business school and management books that talk about the skills and techniques 
necessary for running an organization according to a strategic plan and goal. 
What makes this literature useful, and the organizations to which it applies 
extensive, is the relative consistency in goals of this type of entity.  At least as an 
abstract model, for-profits have one overarching purpose: maximizing profit.  
They also have a group who receives the benefit of reaching that goal 
successfully (stockholders), a market for assessing the current and future success 
of that activity (the stock price), and a group of people who profess to be able to 
evaluate the performance (market analysts).  They also have a board of directors 
who are legally responsible for pursuing these goals for the company as a whole, 
who have at least some financial interest in a positive result, and have some 
background in the field.  Their failure to reach that goal can also be the subject of 
stringent market forces—namely, bankruptcy, hostile takeover, or rapid financial 
decline. 
Of course, in offering these obviously simplistic principles, one immediately 
concedes they constitute merely a model—in the Weberian sense, an ideal type.  
Everyone recognizes how this system can fail on its own terms—sometimes 
miserably.  The corporate governance scandals several years ago, which led to 
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the demise of several Wall Street firms in the 
recent financial services meltdown, and the slow decline of the Detroit auto 
industry, are all examples of the system not working well.  Managers may pursue 
their own short-term goals of income (through stock options or short-term 
profits), the Board may not have a good idea of the business or the financial 
incentive to figure it out, the company may pursue short-term rather than long-
term profits, and the success or lack of success of the company may have more to 
do with general market conditions or luck, rather than any good long-term 
business strategy.  Finally, for-profit enterprises have constituencies, such as 
employees, or the local community, etc., which have independent power and are 
not necessarily seeking to further the aforementioned principles. 
My point, however, is not that corporations are uniformly successful in 
pursuing these goals or are even necessarily structured well to pursue them.  It is 
certainly not that corporations should necessarily follow these goals exclusively.  
Rather, my point is only that there is some modicum of agreement as to what 
type of goals should generally be pursued and some underlying agreement about 
what success might look like.  For the most part, the standard model of a for-
profit corporation vests the board with substantive decisionmaking power and 
establishes a mode of distinguishing between goals; the long-term purpose of the 
chief executive is profitability.  This offers a way of discussing why one set of 
goals should or should not take precedence over others and managing the 
disagreement between groups over those goals. 
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The same cannot generally be said of academic institutions, including law 
schools.  Academic institutions can, and often do, directly pursue a wider set of 
objectives with a host of different constituencies that may wish to identify with 
and take ownership of those purposes.  The list of potential goals and principles 
are as wide as the imagination, and a large number of independent groups—
students, faculty, alumni, central university administrators, the bar, the 
community—can all make legitimate claims to speak for these underlying goals.   
The case of law schools is illustrative.  Students, for example, may press the 
institution to provide the best skills education for them and placement in 
remunerative professional positions; faculty may want to teach more theoretical 
topics and receive the strongest support for their scholarship and the recruitment 
of colleagues who will be engaged in parallel efforts; the university may want a 
law school to be part of a wider intellectual and professional community (all the 
way from English departments to education schools) which we should connect 
with and maybe help support, financially and intellectually; the legal profession 
may press schools to help further the profession, which can include improving 
the courts as well as the activities of those in practice; and the community may 
wish that we directly further the public interest of our society, whether by helping 
those less financially well off or less powerful.  Last, and certainly not least, the 
alumni may want the institution to be more “prominent,” which can include 
maintaining its historical legacy, advancing its public visibility, or furthering a 
number of other objectives. 
This less focused pursuit of the economic bottom line reflects, in part, the 
different nature of non-profit and academic enterprises.  Over the years, non-
profit and academic “markets,” as it were, have tended to be less subject to strict 
market accountability and exacting “consumer” sovereignty.  As Professor Henry 
Hansmann and others have pointed out, non-profit institutions arise in part 
because of the relative inability of consumers or donors to evaluate the precise 
quality of what the institution does, that is, its “product.”  Their non-profit status 
is one way of ensuring the profit motive does not create a perverse incentive and, 
hopefully, focuses them in other directions.   
Health care and education are classic examples.  In such situations, where 
consumers or donors may be less able to evaluate the quality of what they are 
getting, other factors may have more salience.  General historical reputation, 
culture, visibility, and related alumni networks may matter more than, and offer a 
degree of independence from, direct and immediate market accountability.  
External support also impacts the nature of the decisionmaking.  These 
institutions receive funds through government subsidies, tax exemptions, and 
donations that are explicitly predicated on their pursuit of other goals separate 
from generating a surplus.  In this sense, the bottom line—the generation of 
additional resources—may be improved (paradoxically) by not obsessing directly 
with the bottom line but by pursuing these other goals. 
Of course, this is not to say that law schools and academic institutions are 
insensitive to the bottom line, that is, the generation of income and resources.  
Far from it.  We need to be able to make our payroll, pay our rent, and support 
the wide variety of initiatives described above.  We also recognize that being 
successful at all the separate goals described above—recruiting and supporting 
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faculty, teaching and placing students, helping the community and university—
can directly and indirectly increase the size of the bottom line, including 
philanthropic support.  However, “the bottom line” has a different meaning and 
significance in this context; it is a means to an end, not an end in itself.  Showing 
a large surplus at the end of the year does not define success, nor does taking 
initiatives that would add to that income.  If that were the standard, a host of 
academic institutions would triple their tuition and double the size of their 
student bodies.  Rather, the ultimate purpose is to further a separate set of 
eleemosynary goals which form the vision for the institution. 
To the extent this difference in incentives and accountability exists, what 
does it mean for the skills required for management of the entity?  What is the 
significance of having a diversity of potential goals, all of which are (on some 
level) legitimate and valuable but which are not comparable according to some 
clear commensurable metric and which cannot all be pursued exclusively?  That 
is the fundamental organizational question.  Let me underscore three differences 
that relate directly to the fact that an administrator is less likely to oversee an 
enterprise with a shared set of goals as well as the ability to marshal the 
independent centers of influence within the institution toward those goals. 
First, and most important, the leader of an academic non-profit must be 
skilled in managing differences in views between the various constituencies that 
can rightfully claim to speak for the institution.  Given the existence of many 
separate and independent sources of influence—because there is no single group 
of “stockholders” with a shared goal—the leader cannot overwhelm the different 
constituencies, fire them, or dismiss their arguments because they are 
inconsistent with the long-term goals of the institution.  There are a number of 
groups—faculty, alumni, students, trustees, community representatives—who 
can claim to speak for the goals of the institution and who cannot be ignored.  
This may be because they have tenure (such as faculty), or they have a certain 
degree of independence (such as students or alumni), or they are a source of 
potential support (such as alumni and the community). 
Apart from their independence, there is also a deliberative difference.  While 
for-profit managers do need to manage conflict, the differences in goals of the 
various constituencies have a relatively common metric: the long-term 
profitability of the enterprise.  In contrast, there is no necessary common metric 
to balance the goals of public service, student skills education, faculty 
scholarship, and community involvement.  Mediating differences of vision 
becomes a critical factor in deanly or presidential success. 
These observations might appear to suggest the leader of an academic 
institution is a mere politician.  But that is not the description that best captures 
the role.  In the classic political context, elected politicians have one ultimate 
group which evaluates their success—the voters.  There may be a host of other 
individuals who indirectly impact the reaction of the voters, including the press, 
campaign contributors, and interest groups.  But in the end, there is one group 
which might be viewed as determining success or failure.  The head of an 
educational non-profit, in contrast, has no single group which is the ultimate 
sovereign—at least not in the same sense of most politicians. 
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This leads to a second related difference between the leader of a for-profit 
and an academic leader: the importance of a vision.  Nobody speaks of the vision 
in the case of for-profit enterprises because they do not need an intellectual 
means for integrating the various components of the enterprise.  Leaders of 
academic institutions and other non-profits need to be able to mediate different 
goals in a way that leads the various actors to rise beyond their particular 
differences and agree on a more synthetic vision of the institution.  Obviously, 
the rightness or wrongness of that vision is not something that can be determined 
by some clear, commensurable metric, like profitability, but rather by the 
ultimate agreement of or acceptance by the relevant constituencies.  That is what 
gives it its political element.  But to say that it is political is not to say that it is 
unimportant or vacuous.  Far to the contrary.  To the extent the leader cannot 
mediate that difference of opinion, the institution may stagnate and decline, 
under any standard, including a traditional managerial for-profit standard.  In 
effect, political divisions will make the institution ineffective in achieving any 
goal. 
The third quality (perhaps implicit in the first two) is the importance of 
communication.  If the standards for evaluating the success of the enterprise are 
less clear, and accumulating income is not a goal in itself, the ability to explain 
success and articulate what constitutes a success is a major part of the dean’s or 
president’s job.  We can talk about the quality of students matriculating, the 
amount and importance of the faculty scholarship, the placement of the students, 
the public service performed by the institution, and the buildings and programs 
created.  But the fact that there is not a common metric to compare and assess 
these ideals means that a dean or president needs to be able to explain why all of 
this is important and valuable to the various constituencies, to the society, and 
ultimately, to the “institution.”  In this sense, there is a symbolic element of the 
job that has substantive significance in moving the institution forward, indeed, in 
defining and explaining what it means to move the institution forward. 
Viewed in this light, the importance of common visible metrics, like the 
U.S. News and World Report ranking, becomes more understandable, whether or 
not they are justifiable.  In a world where the various constituencies may be less 
clear of the quality of what is being done or how they interrelate and lack some 
clear means to assess overall performance, the significance of institutional 
communication and of seemingly precise metrics like a U.S. News ranking has 
greater force.  It is impossible to believe that a U.S. News ranking of automobile 
companies would have the same salience or influence. 
These political and communication skills can mean different things in 
different contexts.  It may mean that the dean or president can give eloquent 
speeches, connect with members of the community, including students, alumni, 
faculty, and members of the profession, or articulate a vision for the society to 
garner support.  From the traditional managerial perspective, these skills may 
seem less important, but to an institution that has a less clear bottom line, this 
cultural role can be essential.  Presidents may be successful because they can 
connect with people and are friendly, while other presidents, who are generally 
regarded as having turned an institution around from a managerial perspective, 
are not viewed as successful.  The point is fundamental: a dean or president may 
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be making all of the substantive financial and academic decisions “correctly,” at 
least in terms of traditional managerial efficiency, but the communications 
functions may ultimately be as important to her perceived success. 
This situation has a number of interesting consequences.   First, the ability to 
undertake significant change in an academic institution, and achieve real success, 
can be more difficult.  With many independent actors with veto authority and 
lack of agreement on goals, deans and presidents are less likely to be able to 
initiate major change.  There are too many independent people and entities to 
bring together to cause transformative change.  Indeed, even if the leader was 
able to bring about such change, it is not clear they would always have the 
incentive to try, since the various constituencies in the institution often lack 
agreement on what a successful end result would look like.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that, in the academic arena, in contrast to the for-profit world, there 
have been very few institutions that have risen or fallen significantly in terms of 
either general reputation or quality.  While General Motors, Kodak, Xerox, and 
IBM are not the dominant institutions they once were, and Google, Microsoft, 
and Wal-Mart have risen from nowhere, the ranking of the Top Ten Universities 
has not changed significantly over the last 200 years. 
For similar reasons, we do not see many significant structural changes being 
undertaken at universities.  For example, while for-profit companies remake their 
profile with the closing and spinning-off of a substantial number of units, 
universities very seldom initiate the same level of structural change.  It is almost 
unheard of for a university to actually close a school. 
At the same time, while the benefits of significant action are less clear, the 
costs of inaction may be less obvious.  In a for-profit world, profitability, 
takeover, and bankruptcy hold managers accountable—for good or naught.  In 
the non-profit world, such bottom line success or failure is less relevant.  
Outsiders do not have the ability or incentive to intervene. 
All of these issues can be particularly applicable to law school deans.  While 
law schools, like these other institutions, house multiple political and intellectual 
constituencies, the dean is often more directly involved with those groups than is 
the norm in academia.  There are two reasons.  First, law schools are generally 
small, without departments, department chairs, physical research, non-teaching 
operation, or a large number of PhD-type graduate students.  As a result, they do 
not have the large bureaucracies of academic and administrative intermediaries 
that usually exist between a president and their university and many deans and 
their university.  The law school dean must deal directly with academics that 
come from vastly different intellectual backgrounds and mediate their different 
visions.  Second, the culture of the school generally envisions each group having 
access to the head; there is not a professional or academic hierarchy, as you 
would find in a school of arts and sciences or a medical school, for example.  The 
students, deans, faculty, and administrative staff naturally look to the dean 
directly.  This may be a function of the structure described above, but it is also a 
function, I suspect, of culture.  A law school class involves a faculty member 
directly engaged with individual students.  Students expect to have individual 
access.  So do faculty, who have a taste for governance and the ability to exercise 
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it.  As a result, there is no large structure of intermediate institutions that make 
decisions and resolve conflict. 
In the end, this story of academic administration has both a positive and a 
negative aspect.  On the one hand, academic administration is extremely 
challenging and requires a wide variety of different skills: management, personal 
connection, vision, strategic ambition.  Because of their widely disparate roles, 
the truly great academic leaders have to be part visionary leader, part obsessive 
manager, and part mother superior.  Possessing only one skill usually will not 
lead to long-term success.  On the other hand, there is also a certain degree of 
freedom that this constraint offers.  To the extent that there is not one metric to 
evaluate the success of a dean, and many different constituencies, there is greater 
latitude for the dean.  She can pick and choose what part of the intellectual 
portfolio she wishes to pursue, and she understands that she will not be held 
obsessively accountable by any one standard.  The dispersion of authority and 
diversity of metrics thus offers both a challenge and an opportunity.  Nothing she 
does will be completely right, but, then again, nothing can be completely wrong. 
This leads to a final query, with which I conclude this, admittedly, highly-
speculative piece.  What happens if the academic world described here suddenly 
becomes subject to rapid change?  Put more directly, what happens if the direct 
market accountability of non-profits increases dramatically?  The independence 
of the various components of academic institutions described here is a function of 
their relative financial security and related legal and cultural structure.  Academic 
institutions are now largely able to enroll a class, hire faculty, place their 
students, and contribute to the community without substantial challenges to the 
fundamental quality of their decisions.  Changes are initiated at the margin, and 
the success of the school will be measured by the incremental improvement along 
individual dimensions.  But to the extent that resources ever become substantially 
more constrained, and the consumers of our products more focused on the value-
added aspect of our service, the position of university presidents and deans may 
need to evolve. 
How would it change?  Such changes would undoubtedly be different for 
different institutions.  The historical need to coordinate the various independent 
sources of perspective and power will continue, but the costs of not undertaking 
significant change might increase.  In short, the skills needed for the job will be 
as varied as ever, but the costs of mistake or inaction would increase as well.  
Only the future can say what effect this might have on the leadership and risk-
taking of the leaders of these institutions. 
